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FOREWORD
This is the third year in which the faculty members of the Vanderbilt Law School have prepared the Annual Survey of Tennessee Law.'
The undertaking is, of course, primarily for the benefit of the members
of the Bench and Bar of Tennessee. We hope that they have found it
sufficiently useful to justify the effort and expense involved. The
first Survey was confined almost entirely to the decisions of the
State Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It has now been
expanded to provide for systematic inclusion of federal decisions involving Tennessee law and occasionally even decisions of other states
when theyr interpret or apply Tennessee law. Unfortunately, the acts
of the last session of the General Assembly have not become available
in usable form in time to be incorporated in this year's Survey. Some
attempt has been made to include decisions and regulations of state
administrative agencies; further development along this line is being
studied. Attempts to include unreported opinions of the state appellate
or trial courts have been contemplated but have not appeared feasible.
Suggestions from members of the Bar for improvement of the Survey
will be sincerely welcomed.
The Survey has proved a larger and somewhat more difficult enterprise than was originally contemplated; it has also proved more
valuable to us who have prepared it. One may scan the advance
sheets and think that a hasty inspection of the opinions is keeping
him adequately acquainted with developments in various fields of law.
But when he tries to write down these holdings in a systematic
fashion and show how they fit into the existing law in the state and
how they compare with the law in other states, he begins to realize
how incomplete was the impression obtained when he merely perused
the opinion.
As we have prepared the articles for the Survey, one matter particularly has troubled us. Occasionally we have offered critical comments concerning some of the decisions discussed. We are anxious
that the lawyers and judges of the state understand the spirit in which
1. This Survey covers, approximately, those cases which were reported dur-

ing the period from June 1, 1954, to June 1, 1955. Volumes of the National
Reporter System covered are as follows: 267-277 S.W.2d, 209-220 F.2d, 120129 F. Supp.
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this is done. The comments are not made under the brash assumption
that we are better qualified to make the decisions and write the
opinions than are the judges, but are instead offered respectfully and
in the hope that they may be of value to both judges and lawyers.
Recently one of our members was reading a book by one of the
great law teachers of the country. It contained some remarks which
are very pertinent here and which we should like to quote in full as
expressing our own attitude:
"To the judges whose opinions we criticize and who may chance to
read what we have written we must often appear as captious and intolerant critics. To ... them I would like further to explain.

"First, we necessarily become specialists, not merely in law but in
relatively narrow fields of law. We are given time and opportunity to
read widely and to think through problems in light of what we have
read. We American law teachers have at our disposal time and opportunity to read the opinions of all the American courts which touch our
specialties, together with those of many of the courts of other countries,
as well as the mass of relevant .legal and non-legal literature so far as
lies within our language limitations. We have the opportunity of discussing our special problems with others, not only with the members
of our own law faculty but also with the members of other faculties in

the university, who have knowledge of economic and social factors which

bear upon these legal problems. We claim no superior intelligence. Most
of what we know is second-hand and we act merely to pass on the
knowledge and insight which oar duties require us to acquire.
"A judge, on the other hand, is a specialist in law, but unless he is
a judge in a court dealing with a narrow range of subjects, as in a
probate, patent or tax court, it is seldom that he can be a specialist in
any particular branch of the law. He is obliged to rely for his knowledge
of the particular problem largely upon what the attorneys for the litigants
bring to him. His area for decision is as broad as the law and except
as he can find material in the briefs of the attorneys, each of whom is
tempted to present a distorted picture, he must rely primarily upon
his acquaintance with general principles, his intimate knowledge of a
relatively few cases and his sense of fairness. When life was less complex
and controversies relatively simple, the cases for him to read and the
subjects for decision far less numerous than at present, it was not too

difficult for a judge or a lawyer to know a great deal about all branches

of the law. This of course is no longer possible. A judge may be called
upon today to untangle a snarl in a corporate reorganization requiring
intimate knowledge of many diverse matters of fact, or to determine an
intricate tax matter which may depend upon a succession of more or
less conflicting federal and state statutes. In the same way that in the
law schools we now find it difficult to give to the students in three years
an adequate presentation of even the fundamental problems which a
lawyer is likely to meet in practice, so too the judge finds it increasingly
difficult to attempt to encompass the whole range of the law.
"Secondly, a judge must reach a decision. He cannot, as we law
teachers tend-to do, present the argument for both sides and all too
often reach only the conclusion that it is difficult or impossible to say

what the result should be. Nor can a judge properly postpone decisions,
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as we can, until a happy solution strikes him. He must decide. All
of this means that I fully realize the difficulties which judges have and
especially those whose calendars are so filled with cases that even
the most facile must find difficulty in having time to clear his mind
and organize his reasons. Thus if we who scrutinize the cases in the
light of our special knowledge do not occasionally find inconsistencies
and intellectual solecisms in opinions and sometimes criticize inadequate
explanations for dubious results, it would mean either that the judges
are supermen or that we are not performing our functions. In most
cases, we cannot properly blame the judge, although disagreeing with
his result. Furthermore, we should be conscious of the fact that even
as we criticize we may be wrong; we may be prisoners of our specialization. We may fail to understand forests because of an over-minute
examination of individual trees. At best our criticisms are colored by
our academic life. At worst they are unreal.
"This explains why although I have often criticized and shall continue
to criticize decisions with which I disagree, I have a profound respect for
judicial opinions and the law which the judges have developed." 2
2. SEAVEY, CorrATONS ON TORTS 48-50 (1954). The Vanderbilt Law Review
expresses its appreciation to Professor Seavey and to the University of Nebraska Press for their permission to quote at length from this work.

